What did Moore mean by the "Naturalistic Fallacy"? What is "naturalistic" about it? Is it really a fallacy? Has either G J Warnock or Philippa Foot succeeded in establishing the legitimacy of ethical naturalism?

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If I am asked, What is good? my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter. Or if Im asked, How is good to be defined? my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.


G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica


Indeed it does appear that this is all Moore has to say about it. The absence of any acceptable proof that his position is more tenable than that of the ethical naturalists or metaphysicians makes it necessary for him to make this point so forcibly. The quotation above is the meta-ethical equivalent of the maxim of Bishop Butlers on the title page of Principia Ethica, Everything is what it is, and not another thing.; We are here concerned with meta-ethics, that is, the meaning of ethical terms, rather than with ethics proper which, as that branch of philosophy which deals with human behaviour, might be described as the practical application of philosophical ideas. It was only within the field of meta-ethics that G.E.Moore was at all influential. His ethical comments to the effect that since no one can know for sure what is good, it is probably wisest to keep to the moral conventions of the society one happens to live in, rather than to rely on ones individual intuition which one has no means of testing, were obviously of little help or interest to the moral philosopher or even an interested outsider who was truly concerned with the question of good actions and right behaviour. It is interesting that Moore objected to naturalism on the grounds that it offered no real reason, or even any reason at all, for any ethical principle and was nevertheless the cause of people accepting unsound principles. Yet G. J. Warnock pointed out in Contemporary Moral Philosophy that Moore on questions of what is good? claimed that reason had no place in the answer, while on questions of what is right? merely defined right as that which leads to the greatest good, near utilitarian consideration of the consequences of particular actions. Moore expended much of his energy in refuting what he described as the naturalistic fallacy so perhaps we should not expect too much from him. He did at least open the way for his successors to show how non-naturalism, or intuitionism as it came to be regarded, applied to the study of ethics.


Moore holds as the basis of his theory that good is a simple notion like yellow which is indefinable, rather than a complex notion like horse which has many different characteristics which can be enumerated. Good is thus one of the ultimate terms of reference used in defining anything and so the question What do you mean when you say that something is good? is among the unintelligible questions which often confront philosophers. Since the most usual type of truth is one which asserts a relation between two existing things, many philosophers assume that ethical truths conform to this pattern although, Moore asserts, they quite obviously do not.


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This misconception is the basis of the naturalistic fallacy. In the fallacy, good is defined either by reference to a natural object (hence Ethical Naturalism, as Bentham and Mill) or to an object only inferred to exist in a suppressible real world (hence Metaphysical Ethics, as in Socrates and Bradley). It is an attempt to overcome the gulf between the is (that is, a statement of empirical fact) and the ought (or ethical conclusion) . The fallacy can be said to occur at three separate points firstly, in defining a non-natural property like goodness in terms of a natural one; secondly, in defining one property in terns of another with which it is not identical and thirdly, in attempting to define the indefinable. It is the essence of Moores position that an ethical sentence cannot be reduced to a non-ethical one, whether empirical theological, mathematical or any other. In other terms description and evaluation are only different but quite independent activities, the relationship between them being based on standards which are not universal.


Having established his opinion that good is a simple, indefinable notion, Moore goes on to examine and criticise the alternatives. He sees two alternatives, either that good is a complex notion capable of analysis or it is meaningless. He refutes the first alternative by the open question theory, that is, by stating that to ask a further question is that good? of any property found to be part of the notion good is not tautologous but a valuable extension of the argument. He refutes the other less surely, by saying that everyone understands what is meant by good in some vague sense although the notion of a good may be confused with other properties. Moores ideas on the relation of other properties associated with and maybe always and only present with good is made very clear by this qualogy from Hospers Human Conduct.


Even if all equilateral triangles are equiangular and all equiangular triangles are equilateral it does not follow that equilateral means the same as equiangular for the first word refers to a property of the sides and the second to a property of the angles. So Moore believed that although all good things might be pleasant or useful or highly evolved this did not mean that good means pleasant or useful or could be defined as that which is highly evolved.


Moore himself does not insist on the term naturalistic fallacy in Principia Ethica, and in fact practically states that it is to be understood as he defines it for the purposes of the argument. His reason for qualifying the fallacy as naturalistic is that he sees it as a confusion of a non-natural object, good, with a natural object such as pleasure. However, he gives no reasons for describing good as a non-natural object and in fact, even if it were natural, the proposition would still be a fallacy although the word naturalistic would be less appropriate. Moore does not clearly differentiate natural and non-natural . Natural in this sense does not only mean the sensible world but also the supersensible reality involved in Metaphysical Ethics. Non-natural is given a suggested meaning in Moores A Reply to My Critics - a non-natural property is one which cannot be discerned by the senses. Naturalistic fallacy may be an obscure, misleading and inappropriate term in some ways and Warnock shows in Contemporary Moral Philosophy that from one angle naturalism and non-naturalism could be considered compatible, but generally speaking if Moores definition is sufficiently clear it would be futile to argue over terminology.


Is the naturalistic fallacy really a fallacy? Moores arguments are frequently inadequate. His use of the word definition when he describes good as indefinable is eccentric, since he dismisses the common consensus method of definition and almost equates it with analysis of characteristics. Moores basic procedure is open to question, since to establish that good is indefinable he uses the analogy of the simple notion. yellow and the complex notion horse. Analogy does not alone make for good argument however plausible it seems. After this, he attempts actual proof but by means of a dilemma, arguing against the alternatives he cites to leave his theory standing alone. These are not good arguments and added to the question begging formulation of the fallacy itself seem to show that even Moore could not prove his theory. The ideas of G J Warnock and Philippa Foot will be given below but Frankenas formulation reveals the inconclusive nature of Moores arguments . According to Frankena, there are three points at which a fallacy could be said to falsify the naturalist view but at none of these does Moore offer any proof; he simply begs the question. The first point comes when a non-natural property like goodness is defined in terms of a natural one, but Moore simply states that goodness i6 a non-natural property. The second point is when one property is defined in terms of another, but he does not show that goodness is indisputably some other thing from each particular property with which it could be equated. The third is in attempting to define the indefinable, but again he does not prove that goodness is a simple and therefore indefinable property; merely asserting it to be so. The most obvious begging of the question is in the open question theory. Moores argument is that good cannot be complex because it is still significant to ask is this property of good good? but this begs the question for it already assumes that goodness is simple and unanalysable. If good were allowed to be a complex notion, then it would make sense to inquire whether that into which one had analysed it was good. Indeed this might be way of testing the analysis. Moore assumes that there must only be one notion before the mind in considering good, but it is just as much of a fallacy to assume there are two se properties, such as good and pleasure, when there is only one as to assume the opposite. Moores arguments are thus shown to be unprovable even illogical at times. If the naturalistic fallacy is to be accepted as a fallacy it must be on other arguments. The position is perhaps not one which involves a fallacy at all, merely some defect in the moral vision of either non-naturalists or naturalists whereby naturalists fail to discern the separate ethical entities which intuitionists believe are discernible or non-naturalists suffer from double vision in seeing good or any other ethical concept as distinct from other, natural properties.


Of the chapter on Naturalism in Contemporary Moral Philosophy G. J. Warnock says I shall not see to show that naturalism is true for that purposes it is not clear enough what naturalism is supposed to be. Although fairly violent in his attack on intuitionism. Warnock treats the idea of a naturalistic fallacy with more consideration. However, although he admits that it is probably true that in general no particular description logically leads to any particular evaluation, he does not think this revelation of very great importance for moral philosophy. He suggests that there are certain standards, not specified, which may not have to be accepted at all, but which do have to be accepted if moral evaluation is to be made. He therefore concludes that it is possible to be a naturalist in ethics and non-naturalist or anti-naturalist in the general theory of evaluation so the terms as they stand are misleading. The difficulty of transferring non-naturalist meta-ethics into a working moral code without accepting certain facts or features as criteria for judgement is quite outstanding, so that intuitionists have frequently fallen back on the so-called repository of human wisdom in prevailing moral attitudes. However, Warnock does not even suggest what these criteria might be so his theory is only a background against which other naturalist theories can stand up.


Philippa Foot in Moral Beliefs sets out from the start to convert the sceptics This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their argument is based. This is indeed the procedure she uses - to extract the assumptions of the non-naturalists and examine them critically. In her view the distinction between statements of fact and evaluation is based on two assumptions, firstly, that any individual may, properly, base his beliefs about matters of value on premises which no-one else would recognise as valid at all; secondly, he may refuse to accept anothers evaluation because their standards are not ones be accepts. The first assumption is refuted by an appeal to the basic idea that words, while they may not have an intrinsic meaning, do have a proper use, and that evaluative terms like good bad, value, etceteras have a proper use in a generalised sense without a particular background being necessary to explain their use in the context. Foot makes this clearer by reference to the use of words like proud and dangerous, then goes on to say that- It is surely clear that moral virtues must be connected with human good or harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything you like good or harm;. Against the second assumption, Foot puts forward the tentative idea that moral question can be argued down to a point which reveals an ultimate end beyond which it is ridiculous to inquire, as it does not make sense to ask Why do you hate pain? or Why do you want to feel happy? Concentrating on the harmful or beneficial consequences of actions for the individual, however, Foot finds it difficult to explain the moral virtue of such concepts as justice although later, as in the Introduction to Theories of Ethics she sees the relevance of the consequences of actions for the community or the general good. Both these refutations seem to me to be well founded, although again the concern is primarily with ethics and not meta-ethics, with use rather than meaning.


There would certainly seem to be a dichotomy between non-naturalism as dealing with meta-ethics and naturalism as dealing with ethics. Both are definitely on shaky ground in the opponents field. I have not considered the arguments of the non-cognitivists or emotivises that good and related concepts have no meaning but are merely expressions of feelings or attitudes in the individual or society. This may indeed have the Bergsonian advantage of dismissing the whole thing (i.e. meta-ethics) in one fell swoop by denying it. However, naturalism still seems to hold the advantages as far as action guiding or the formulation of a moral code is concerned. In major problem, as Hospers puts it is to find a naturalist theory which is in the least degree plausible. The most plausible theory I have come across is Ralph Barton Perrys theory that the end of all action should be the maximum possible fulfilment or pro-interests of everyone concerned which is almost an amalgam of Utilitarianism in society and self-realisation in the individual. This is the least limiting definition of goodness or right action covering wide areas of human experience. To enthuse, and quote with a few basic definitions, the whole field of; human values including ethics, are organised in such a way that every item now springs into place a frustratingly complex area of inquiry has become simplified and clarified. It achieves unity and gives a naturalist theory in one brilliant stroke..


John Hospers, Human Conduct


G. E. Moore Principia Ethica


Mary Warnock Ethics Since 100


John Hospers Human Conduct


G. J. Warnock Contemporary Moral Philosophy


Philippa Foot Introduction to Theories of Ethics


Philippa Foot Moral Beliefs in Theories of Ethics


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